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LESSONS FROM THE LINDH CASE:
PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT*
M.KB. Darmert
INTRODUCTION
Few recent cases have been as provocative as that of the
"American Taliban,"1 John Walker Lindh, who recently pled
guilty to charges carrying a prison term of twenty years.2 Ever
since this American son of privilege was captured fighting
alongside American enemies in Afghanistan, his case has
stirred passionate feelings and posed difficult legal and moral
• 3
questions.
The legal case against Lindh4 was based largely upon
admissions he made to interrogators after he was captured in
02002 M.K.B. Darmer. All Rights Reserved.
Assistant Professor, Chapman University School of Law. A.B., Princeton
University; J.D., Columbia University. Former Assistant United States Attorney,
S.D.N.Y. This article was supported by a research grant from Chapman University. In
addition, I owe thanks to Dean Scott W. Howe and Professors Yale Kamisar and Lisa
Litwiller for comments on earlier drafts; Dr. Robert M. Baird and Professors Kurt
Eggert and Gregory H. Fox for helpful insights; Robert Maynes, Karl Triebel and
Pamela Anderson for diligent research assistance; the editorial board and the staff of
the Brooklyn Law Review for helpful editing and, most especially, Roman E. Darmer II,
Esq., for invaluable support. Any errors are, of course, entirely my own.
1 See Laurie Levenson, Native Son, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 28, 2002, at 7.
2 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A);
Neil A. Lewis, American Who Joined Taliban Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al.
3 See Katharine Q. Seelye, American Charged as a Terrorist Makes First
Appearance in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al (stating that defense lawyers
intended to stage "potential trial of the new century" in the Lindh case). Among other
things, Lindh argued that the government's case against him violated his right to
freedom of association. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Counts Two Through Nine on Freedom of Association,
Overbreadth and Vagueness Grounds (Motion #3), United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37-A,
2002 WL 1489373 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2002). This article focuses on claims made by
Lindh implicating the constitutionality of his confession.
4 Although initially referred to as "Walker," John Walker Lindh has since
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Afghanistan.5 Lindh's admissions were made without counsel6
and, he claimed, under conditions so onerous that any waiver of
rights and subsequent confession must be judged involuntary.
For example, Lindh alleged that he was interrogated after
being bound naked to a stretcher and placed in a windowless
shipping container.7
American courts can now avoid ruling on difficult
questions about the constitutionality of his confession: on July
15, 2002, Lindh entered his plea of guilty on the day that a
protracted hearing on his motion to suppress his confession
was to begin.8 In some ways, the Lindh case was unusual.
Lindh was captured as a Taliban comrade-in-arms in
Afghanistan, but was to be tried in a conventional civilian
court. In contrast, the government designated Yaser Esam
Hamdi, the so-called "second American Talib,"9 as an "enemy
combatant," and detained him at the Norfolk Naval Station
resumed using his family name, Lindh, as his surname. See Walker No More, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at All.
See Government's Opposition to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Release and Government's Proffer in Support of Detention at 4, United States v. Lindh
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A) ('The Government's case against Lindh includes
numerous statements he made to military personnel, to the FBI and to the media.");
William Glaberson, Whether Walker Knew of Counsel Is Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2002, at A15 ("The case against him is almost entirely based on his own statements,'
said H. Richard Uviller, a criminal law expert at Columbia Law School, 'so if those
statements are barred from court, there goes the case."'); see also Steven Brill, End of
Their Rope, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 15, 2002, at 48 (emphasizing importance of confession to
case); cf. Government's Proffer at 5 ("[I]t is not just his statements that incriminate
Lindh;" an "array of corroborating evidence . . .support[s] Lindh's statements to the
FBI.").
6 See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Compel Production of Discovery in Response to Government's
March 15, 2002, Notice of Documents Filed in Camera at 1, United States v. Lindh
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A) (asserting that statements allegedly made to the
government were made during period when "the government held Mr. Lindh
incommunicado, denying him communications from his family or counsel"); see also
Seelye, supra note 3, at Al (stating that defense lawyers claim Lindh was held
"incommunicado" for fifty-four days after requesting a lawyer).
7 See Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions at 18,
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A); see also Defendant's Supp. Mem.
to Compel at 3-5 (describing circumstances surrounding Lindh's capture and
confinement); Brill, supra note 5 (arguing that the most damning confession was made
after Lindh was strapped in a container for three days and was denied request for
lawyer). A photograph of Lindh in the container was widely circulated. Cf. Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (confession held involuntary where, inter alia,
defendant was stripped of clothing and held in that condition for several hours).
8 See Lewis, supra note 2.
9 See Richard A. Seranno & Greg Miller, A Second American Talib Might Be
in U.S. Custody, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A16.
[Vol. 68: 1
LESSONS FROM THE LINDH CASE
Brig without filing criminal charges. ° The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit recently denied Hamdi access to counsel,1'
whereas Lindh had a small army of privately retained defense
counsel advising him when he entered his guilty plea. 12 The
disposition of the Lindh case and the status of Hamdi
underscore the significance of the formal designation "enemy
combatant" 3 and also the difficulty of fitting a case like Lindh's
into the traditional framework of a criminal case.
The exact circumstances of a case like Lindh's may be
unlikely to recur. Yet, future courts will undoubtedly confront
similar issues in confessions law that force a balancing of a
suspect's civil rights against the demands of national security.
This Article uses the Lindh case to examine enduring
questions related to the right against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel in the context of custodial interrogations
and confessions. It does so against the backdrop of the Supreme
Court's somewhat incoherent Fifth and Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
In particular, Lindh provides an opportunity to address
a question heretofore unresolved by the Supreme Court:
whether a "public safety" exception should permit continued
questioning of a suspect who invokes his right to counsel. The
Court has already recognized a public safety exception to
Miranda,4  such that authorities can dispense with the
traditional Miranda warnings in exigent circumstances. 5 In
cases where Miranda warnings are given, however, the Court
in Edwards v. Arizona 16 extended "second-level" protections to a
defendant who invokes his right to counsel.1 7 That is, though
Miranda confers upon a suspect both the "right to remain
10 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing district
court's order appointing counsel and ordering access to detainee).
11 Id.
12 Parties to the plea agreement included five attorneys for Lindh. See Plea
Agreement, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A).
'3 The plea agreement in Lindh specifically provided that the government
would forego designating Lindh as an "enemy combatant," unless Lindh engages in
specifically proscribed future conduct. See Lindh Plea 21.
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring the provision of
warnings to a suspect in advance of custodial interrogation).
15 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). The continued viability of that
exception, however, is called into question by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). See discussion infra Part III.
16 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
17 For the characterization of these protections as "second-level," see YALE
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 521 (10th ed. 2002).
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silent" and the "right to an attorney," a suspect who asks for an
attorney effectively prevents interrogators from asking him any
further questions. Questioning must come to an immediate
halt, and may be reinitiated only by the suspect.
18
Lindh specifically alleged that he invoked his right to
counsel while being interrogated in Afghanistan,19  thus
implicating the Edwards rule.' If Lindh indeed asked for an
attorney, Edwards would have required that government
agents stop interrogating him.2 It appears, however, that the
interrogators persisted.
The Lindh case arose at an awkward time in the
development of confessions law. Since Miranda, the Court has
systematically chipped away at the underpinnings and
implications of that decision.22 On the crest of the new
millennium, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to jettison
the remnants of Miranda in Dickerson v. United States.2• 24
Instead, in a 7-2 decision reflecting an uneasy compromise,the Court tersely endorsed Miranda based on an analysis
1 The Edwards rule was expanded in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990), which held that, when a suspect requests counsel, Edwards bars the police from
reinitiating questioning without counsel's presence even after the defendant actually
consults with his attorney. A suspect who instead asserts his right to remain silent
may be re-questioned by authorities under certain circumstances. See Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) and discussion infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part I.
20 Indeed, Lindh relied heavily on Edwards in his motion to suppress. See
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress
Statements for Violations of His Fifth Amendment Rights (Miranda and Edwards),
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A).
21 More precisely, the government would have been unable to introduce into
evidence against Lindh any statements made in response to continued interrogation.
Courts have held that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause does not occur until
the statement is actually introduced into evidence against a defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
22 See generally Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it
Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1997).
23 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
24 See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure:
Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) ("The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable
critic of Miranda, wrote the majority opinion, is . . . a sure sign of a compromise
opinion, intentionally written to say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a
strong majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality.") (footnote
omitted); cf. Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to Section 3501 to Dickerson to
.... 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 889 (2001) [hereinafter From Miranda] (speculating that
Chief Justice Rehnquist "may have decided that the best resolution of Dickerson would
be a compromise" that affirmed Miranda but also maintained all of the post-Miranda
jurisprudence limiting the impact of Miranda) (footnote omitted).
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widely denounced as unsatisfactory.2 The Court putatively
reaffirmed the "constitutional" foundation of Miranda while,
paradoxically, apparently leaving intact a line of pre-Dickerson
cases that had substantially eroded Miranda by reasoning that
the Miranda warnings were subconstitutional or "merely
prophylactic."- The result is unsettling doctrinal incoherence'
in a critical area of constitutional criminal procedure.
This Article argues that the Lindh case provides a
compelling example of the justification for a "public safety"
exception to Edwards.2 If authorities believed that Lindh
possessed information critical to public safety-if, for example,
there was a basis to believe that he had knowledge of
impending terrorist attacks-then strong policy considerations
would have supported permitting continued interrogation. It is
difficult, however, to square that public policy with the
Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of Miranda in
Dickerson.' If a public safety exception is constitutional in the
See infra note 27.
See infra Part III.C.
Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: Supreme Court's Failures in
Dickerson, 99 MICI L. REV. 898, 901 (2001) [hereinafter Supreme Court's Failures]
(arguing that majority's "cursory treatment" of Court's prior "deconstitutionalization" of
Miranda "leaves Miranda doctrine incoherent"); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and
(Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071 (2001) (stating that
the Dickerson opinion "was, in a word, terrible. The Court, when squarely faced with
the issue of whether the four Miranda warnings were required by the federal
constitution, not only refused to answer coherently, but breached its duty to provide a
justification for Miranda or Dickerson and squandered an opportunity to rationalize
contradictory case law regarding Miranda's exceptions."); The Supreme Court 1999
Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 200 (2000) (noting that the Court's
failure to acknowledge Miranda's core substantive holding "left the Dickerson Court
with no firmer ground for the protection of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights than the
half-hearted assetion that Miranda had become a national habit."). But see Charles D.
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2001)
(arguing that Dickerson placed Miranda "upon a more secure, constitutional footing").
Several lower courts have held that there is a "public safety" exception to
Edwards analogous to the "public safety" exception to Miranda, such that authorities
could persist in questioning a suspect even in the face of his invocation of the right to
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989). Indeed, at least one commentator has argued
that the public safety exception, "taken to its logical conclusion, trumps an Edwards
violation." Garcia, supra note 22, at 464. This argument, however, preceded the
Supreme Court's recent revivification of Miranda in Dickerson. See infra notes 196-216
and accompanying text.
530 U.S. 428 (characterizing Miranda as a "constitutional decision" that
could not be superseded by legislation). The Edwards rule was derived from language
in Miranda providing that questioning must cease until a lawyer is provided when a
suspect invokes his right to counsel. See discussion infra notes 149-51 and
accompanying text.
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wake of Dickerson, then complications arise in defining the
proper scope of the exception.
This Article analyzes issues related to the Lindh
confession in four parts. Part I describes the competing claims
made by Lindh and the government regarding the
circumstances of his confession. That part is not intended to
resolve factual discrepancies, but to provide a context for a
discussion of confessions law. Part II briefly traces the
development of confessions law in this country through
Miranda. Part III then addresses the Supreme Court's post-
Miranda jurisprudence, taking a thematic approach that
focuses on issues likely to recur in cases involving national
security. Sections A and B address the scope of a suspect's right
to have counsel present during interrogation. That discussion
focuses on Edwards v. Arizona,30 which gave increased
protection to a suspect who invoked the "right to counsel"
strand of Miranda, and on Moran v. Burbine,3' which held that
a suspect need not be informed of an attorney's efforts to
contact him in order to make an effective waiver. Section III.C
then turns to the "prophylaxis" cases, which weakened the
thrust of Miranda and undermined the basis for the original
decision. 32 That section focuses particularly on the "public
safety" exception to Miranda developed in New York v.
Quarles,3 which may well have implications for future cases
involving threats to national security.' Section III.D deals with
the Supreme Court's recent Dickerson decision and the way in
which that case implicitly calls into question the continuing
viability of cases, such as Quarles, that are based on a
prophylaxis reading of Miranda. It ultimately concludes that
the public safety exception embodied in Quarles will survive
Dickerson.
30 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
31 475 U.S. 412 (1986). The applicability of Burbine to the Lindh case is
explicitly addressed in Glaberson, supra note 5.
See Lesley A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences,
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 728 (1999) (discussing costs associated with Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' "eviscerat[ion]" of Miranda); see also Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale
L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal For The Abolition Of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C.
L. REV. 69, 74 (1989) ("The Justices' recent attempts to contain Miranda have led to a
mendacious jurisprudence in the confessions area ... .
33 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
See generally Jonathan B. Zeitlin, Voluntariness with a Vengeance:
Miranda and a Modern Alternative, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109 (2001) (arguing for an
expansion of the public safety exception).
[Vol. 68: 1
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Indeed, Part IV argues that the public safety exception
will likely flourish in the wake of concerns for national security
and proposes an expansion of the public safety exception to
cover cases where legitimate concerns for public safety take
precedence over a suspect's Miranda right to counsel.
Specifically, Part IV calls for a "public safety" exception to the
Edwards rule and analyzes ways in which the constraints of.
the Fifth Amendment can be reconciled with the demands of
national security.
I. THE LINDH CASE
A. Allegations Surrounding Lindh's Confession*
According to John Walker Lindh, the United States took
him into custody on December 1, 2001, only after he endured
brutal treatment from Northern Alliance troops in
Afghanistan.& In early November 2001, he and fellow Afghani
troops retreated approximately fifty miles after defending
against an advance of Northern Alliance troops in the Takhar
region." This retreat left Lindh weak and exhausted. 3 On
approximately November 24, Lindh's group turned over their
weapons to Northern Alliance troops under the command of
General Abdul Rashid Dostum, forces that allegedly had a
reputation for committing atrocities against their enemies.39
Dostum's forces imprisoned Lindh and his comrades at the
Qala-I-Jangi ("QIJ") fortress near Mazar-e-Sharif. 4°
Immediately upon Lindh's arrival at QIJ, a co-prisoner
detonated a grenade, causing Dostum's forces to herd the
prisoners into a basement.41 The next day, the captors brought
35 Before pleading guilty, Lindh's motion to suppress his statements rested
on two primary grounds: the claim that his Miranda-Edwards rights had been violated
and the claim that his statements were involuntary. This discussion deals primarily
with Lindh's claims regarding his Miranda and Edwards rights, which are the focus of
this Article. The other claims are provided here in substantially abbreviated form and
will be dealt with more exhaustively in a companion article that more closely analyzes
Lindh's due process claims, M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions
Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y __ (forthcoming 2003)
(draft on file with author).
36 See Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions at 3-5,
United States v. Lindh (E.D.. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A).
37 See id. at 3.
8 See id. at 4.
"3 See id. at 5; see also id. at 2-3, n.6.
4 See id.
41 Defendant's Proffer at 5.
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Lindh and other prisoners out to an open area. They seated the
handcuffed prisoners in rows and beat them.42 After one of the
guards struck Lindh in the head, Lindh noticed two Americans
with guns and cameras walking among the group. 3 The two
Americans" pulled Lindh out of the line and briefly
interrogated him, then returned him to the group.4" Lindh
made no statements at that time."
While sitting with his hands tied, Lindh heard an
explosion and attempted to run, but was shot in the thigh and
played dead for about twelve hours.47 Fellow prisoners then
helped Lindh and others into the basement of QIJ.48 Dostum's
forces eventually killed many of Lindh's comrades. 49 Finally,
"[w]ounded, starved, frozen and exhausted," Lindh "emerged
from the basement on December 1" with about eighty-five other
survivors of the 300 prisoners who had arrived with him at
QIJ. 0
Lindh's captors transported him to Sheberghan.51
United States Special Forces and a CNN reporter encountered
52Lindh in a small room. The reporter, Robert Pelton, asked
Lindh questions, but Lindh refused to grant permission to film
him.5 In response, Lindh alleged, Pelton offered Lindh the food
4 Id. at 6.
4 Id.
One of the Americans was Agent Johnny Michael Spann of the CIA, see
infra note 48.
4 Id. at 7.
See Government's Response to the Defendant's Proffer of Facts at 13,
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A).
47 Defendant's Proffer at 7-8.
48 See id. According to the government, Johnny Michael Spann of the CIA
was conducting interviews of detainees at QIJ, including Lindh, on November 25,
shortly before the prison uprising. Lindh did not answer any of Spann's questions.
Spann was ultimately killed during the uprising. See Affidavit in Support of a Criminal
Complaint and an Arrest Warrant 15, United States v. Lindh, (E.D. Va. 2002) (No.
02-37A).
4 Defendant's Proffer at 9-10.
50 Id. at 10. The government pointed out that these particular circumstances
had nothing to do with its treatment of Lindh while in United States custody. See
Government's Response at 4. Had Lindh not made "astoundingly bad decisions," he
would not have suffered the privations and conditions he experienced during the
retreat and while hunkered down in the basement. Id. In the government's view, Lindh
was not the victim of fate. Rather, he took "extraordinary measures to insert himself
into this war ... and he should not now be heard to complain that life on the battlefield
was unpleasant." Id.
51 Defendant's Proffer at 11. Sheberghan contained both a hospital and a
prison. See id.
52 See id. at 12.
Id. The government argued that Lindh's objection was to being filmed, not
[Vol. 68: 1
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and medical assistance of the U.S. forces in exchange for the
interview.M Only then, "fearing torture and death if he
remained in Dostum's custody," did Lindh agree to the
interview, according to him.5"
The government took strong issue both with Lindh's
suggestion that Pelton was acting in connection with the U.S.
military and Lindh's claim that his statements were
involuntary.' It characterized Pelton as "a reporter hot on the
trail of a sensational story" who needed no prompting to
interview Lindh.57
The CNN interview was broadcast on December 2,
2001."8 In it, Lindh stated that his "heart became attached" to
the Taliban.59
Following the interview with the reporter, Special
Forces personnel interrogated Lindh at a nearby compound,
held him overnight and then transported him to the Turkish
School House at Mazar-e-Sharif.60 Lindh was held there for two
or three days, then interrogated again."' Lindh asserted that he
asked when he could see a doctor or lawyer, more than once,
but that his interrogators "responded that they did not know."6 2
to being questioned. See Government's Response to the Defendant's Proffer of Facts at
2 & n.5, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A).
54 Defendant's Proffer at 12.
1% Id. Lindh ultimately subpoenaed Pelton to testify at the hearing on Lindh's
motion to suppress statements. Lindh sought to suppress the content of his interview
to Pelton in addition to statements made to United States authorities.
Government's Response at 15-16.
57 Id. Specifically, it said that "[t]he notion that Pelton needed the U.S.
military to prompt him to question Lindh is, to put it mildly, preposterous." Id. In
addition, the government argued that Lindh's protestation to Pelton that he did not
wish to be filmed was "hardly an indication of a 'will' that has been overwhelmed," id.,
and pointed out that Lindh's demeanor during the interview demonstrated that he had
his wits about him. See id. at 16-17. Specifically, the government pointed out that
Lindh was "by turns, sharp, polite, cautious, articulate, definite in his opinions, vague
when it serves his purposes, and keenly interested in his precise status. Whatever
privations Lindh claims to have suffered before his arrival at the Sheberghan hospital
facility, he still had his wits fully about him when he was interviewed by CNN." Id. at
16-17. Furthermore, "the notion that the United States military needed CNN to
conduct an interview on its behalf is similarly preposterous." Id. at 16.
58 Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and an Arrest Warrant 13,
United States v. Lindh, (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A).
59 Id. The CNN correspondent also reported that Lindh acknowledged
attending "several training camps," being "trained in the use of a Kalashnikov rifle,"
having seen Bin Laden "several times" and having "beg[u]n his jihad on the front lines
north of Kabul . i.." "d.
0 Id. at 14-15.
61 Id. at 15.
Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions at 16,
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A).
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A bullet remained lodged in Lindh's leg, and he repeatedly
expressed concern about his wound.'
The government denied that Lindh asked for an
attorney during this period.6 While acknowledging that
military personnel did not give Lindh Miranda warnings, it
argued that military interrogation for the purposes of
gathering military intelligence is simply not subject to the
Miranda rules.r
The government flew Lindh to Camp Rhino on
December 7, 2001." Before that flight, according to Lindh, one
soldier told him that he "wanted to shoot him there and then."67
During the flight to Camp Rhino, Lindh alleged that his
handcuffs were so unbearably tight that he screamed,
"pleading with the guards to loosen them." The guards refused
and told Lindh to "shut up" when he asked his captors not to
kill him. 69
Lindh alleged that, at Camp Rhino, guards cut off his
clothes, bound him to a stretcher with duct tape, and placed
him in a windowless metal shipping container, "[c]ompletely
naked, wearing nothing but his blindfold and shaking violently
from the cold nighttime air."70 About twenty minutes later, a
member of the U.S. Marine Corps questioned Lindh briefly
about what he was doing in Afghanistan and whether he was
an American.7'
63 Id. The bullet was removed about two weeks later. See id. at 21. A fuller
discussion of Lindh's medical condition as it relates to the circumstances surrounding
his confession will be addressed in the author's companion due process article. See
supra note 35.
64 See Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Statements for Violation of His Fifth Amendment Rights (Miranda and Edwards) at 29,
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 03-37A) ("We expect that each of his
interrogators during the period December 1 through December 7 will testify
unequivocally that a request for counsel was never made."); see also id. at 30 (stating
that Lindh first asked for counsel on December 12, 2001).
Id. at 3-4, 6-15; cf. id. at 18-20 (arguing that, even if Miranda applied,
Lindh's statements should be admissible under an analogy to the "public safety"
exception to Miranda).
66 See Defendant's Proffer at 17.
67 Id.
68 Id.
Id. at 17-18 (citing to government discovery letter for assertion regarding
Lindh's being told to "shut up").
70 Id. at 18.
71 Defendant's Proffer at 18 (citing Government Discovery Letter #15).
According to Lindh, a lead military interrogator told a Navy physician that "'sleep
deprivation, cold and hunger might be used' during [Lindh's] interrogation." Id. (citing
Government Discovery Letter #21). The government took sharp issue with Lindh's
[Vol. 68: 1
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After remaining confined inside the stretcher for two
days, Lindh said that he was taken, "still blindfolded and
handcuffed," to a nearby building or tent.72 His blindfold was
removed and he was greeted by an FBI agent.73 Then:
The agent told Mr. Lindh he wanted to ask some questions and
proceeded to read from an advise of rights form. Whenever the form
referred to Mr. Lindh's right to counsel, the agent paused and said,
"Of course, there are no lawyers here." Mr. Lindh was not told that
his parents had retained an attorney for him who was ready and
willing to see him in Afghanistan....
After the advice of rights, Mr. Lindh asked when he could see
an attorney. Again the FBI told Mr. Lindh that there were no
lawyers there. Faced with the prospect of being returned to the same
or worse conditions that had immediately preceded his FBI
interrogation, Mr. Lindh signed the waiver form. 4
The government consistently maintained that the FBI
agent who questioned Lindh on December 9 and 10 advised
him of his Miranda rights, and that Lindh acknowledged that
he understood his rights and waived them. 5 It further
contended that Lindh's account of the agent's statement was
claim that it used such tactics to overbear Lindh's will and encourage him to talk. See
Government's Response to the Defendant's Proffer of Facts at 22-24, United States v.
Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A). Specifically, "Lindh's claims-'that the
Government bound him naked and blindfolded in a box to prepare him for
interrogation by the FBI'-[are] simply untrue.... [A]t the time he was interviewed by
the FBI, Lindh had clothes to wear, access to several blankets, had received meals on
December 8 and December 9, and... had slept." Id. at 23. While it did not dispute that
Lindh was placed in a "large metal container," it asserted that he was secured inside
only "initially" and that "[w]ithin an hour or two, he was wrapped in two comforters for
warmth." Government's Opposition to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Release
and Government's Proffer in Support of Detention at 6, United States v. Lindh (E.D.
Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A). Then, within two days, the government provided Lindh with
medical "scrubs" and released him from the stretcher. Id. The government justified
Lindh's confinement, saying that he was "treated as a potentially dangerous detainee
given his suspected affiliation with a terrorist organization." Id. It also asserted that
Lindh received twice-daily medical care from a Navy physician, including antibiotics,
ointment and dressing changes. Id.
7 Defendant's Proffer at 20.
7 Id.
7 Id. Cf. Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (upholding adequacy of
warning where government advised suspect that "[w]e have no way of giving you a
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court").
Had Lindh's suppression motion proceeded to resolution, he likely would have argued
that his case was distinguishable from Egan's because his family had retained a lawyer
ready, willing and able to meet with him.
71 See Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and an Arrest Warrant
5, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A); Defendant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress Statements for Violations of
His Fifth Amendment Rights at 5 (Miranda and Edwards), United States v. Lindh
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37A).
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misleadingly incomplete. According to the government,
although the agent did tell Lindh that no lawyers were
available, he also made clear that, if Lindh wanted an attorney,
the interview would simply cease."
On December 9 and 10, the FBI interviews went
forward, however, and were fruitful. According to the
government, Lindh admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan in
June 2001 to fight with the Taliban; was referred to a group
run by Bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist organization; trained at
an Al Qaeda terrorist training camp for seven weeks and met
with Bin Laden in a small group.77 Ultimately, Lindh "chose to
go to the front lines to fight."78 According to the government,
Lindh further stated that "on September 11 or 12, he learned
about the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York by
radio. According to [Lindh], it was his and his comrades'
understanding ... that Bin Laden had ordered the attacks and
that additional attacks would follow."79 Lindh's admissions
formed the backbone of the government's case against him."
Lindh alleged that his conditions of confinement
improved after the FBI interrogations. 81 Lindh also described
his family's efforts to contact him and communications from an
attorney, James Brosnahan, to government officials.
Brosnahan had been retained by Lindh's parents to represent
their son and, beginning on December 3, Brosnahan asked that
Lindh not be interrogated. On December 14, the government
advised Brosnahan that Lindh was "in the control of the United
States armed forces and is being held aboard the USS
PELELIU in the theater of operations."82
76 Government's Miranda Opposition at 5-6.
Complaint at 7.
78 Id. at 1 9.
7 Id. at 9 10.
80 See, e.g., Complaint (outlining extensive admissions made by Lindh); Neil
A. Lewis, Interviewer of Captured American Must Testify, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2002, at A8, ("the 10-count case against Lindh is knit together almost entirely
from his own candid accounts of involvement with Al Qaeda and the Taliban").
81 Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions at 21,
United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A). On December 14, U.S. personnel
took Lindh to the vessel USS PELELIU. See id. at 21. Later, a Navy physician
operated on Lindh and removed the bullet from his body. Id. The government described
the fact that Lindh received surgery on December 14, and further described Lindh's
treatment aboard the USS PELELIU in favorable terms. See Government's Opposition
to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Release and Government's Proffer in
Support of Detention at 7, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A).
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Compel Production of Discovery in Response to Government's
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A hearing on Lindh's motion to suppress statements
made to U.S. representatives and to CNN correspondent
Robert Pelton was scheduled to begin on July 15, 2002.8
Instead, on that date, Lindh pled guilty to two felony charges
carrying a prison sentence of twenty years.84
B. The Lindh Plea
Lindh pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban
and to carrying explosives during the commission of a felony.
The agreement requires Lindh to cooperate fully with the
United States by providing all information known to him and
by testifying truthfully at any trials or proceedings, including
military tribunals. Lindh also agreed to withdraw all claims of
"mistreatment by the United States military," and he
acknowledged "that he was not intentionally mistreated by the
U.S. military."7 The United States agreed not to designate
Lindh "an unlawful enemy combatant," barring proscribed
future conduct by Lindh.8 8
The government's explicit agreement to forego treating
Lindh as an "enemy combatant" highlights the differences
between the Lindh case and that involving the second
American Talib, Yaser Esam Hamdi. Hamdi has been
specifically designated an "enemy combatant," and that status
has led to his indefinite detention without counsel.89 In recently
arguing against the appointment of counsel for Hamdi, the
government contended that Hamdi's access to counsel would
"interfere with-and likely thwart-ongoing efforts by the
United States military to gather and evaluate intelligence
about the enemy, its assets, and its plans, and its supporters."
9°
Without the status of "enemy combatant," however, Hamdi
March 15, 2002, Notice of Documents Filed in Camera at 8, United States v. Lindh
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A). Lindh alleges that he did not receive mail until about
January 6, 2002. Id.
Scheduling Order, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A)
(filed Feb. 15, 2002); see also Lewis, supra note 2.
84 Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A);
Lewis, supra note 2.
Lindh Plea $ 1.
8 Id. 4.
87 Id. 22.
Id. 21.
See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
90 Brief for Respondent-Appellants at 38, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (4th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-6895).
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would have access to counsel, as Lindh ultimately did. Lindh
also had the opportunity to argue that his confession should
have been suppressed, both because it violated his Fifth
Amendment rights as interpreted by Miranda and Edwards,
and because the statements were involuntary under the Due
Process Clause. While the court in his case avoided that
quagmire, these questions are certain to recur. Deciding
whether confessions should come into evidence often pits the
rights of the accused against the interests of security.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONFESSIONS LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
For most of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
analyzed the admissibility of confessions under the auspices of
the Due Process Clauses to the Constitution, deciding on a
case-by-case basis whether confessions were "involuntary."9
The Court's confession cases, however, yielded "no talismanic
definition of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the host
of situations where the question arose." Rather, the
voluntariness test involved "a complex of values."' Professor
Steven Penney recently identified three concerns that
dominated the Court's opinions during this era:94 the
unreliability of confessions extracted under questionable
circumstances, deterring abusive police practices95 and
91 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (explaining that
"notions of due process" prohibited coerced confessions before Miranda); Michigan v.
.Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) ("In state cases the Court applied the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to
determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a
subsequent confession involuntary."); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959)
(describing case as "another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a
confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment.");
see also Darmer, supra note 35 (tracing history of due process law in confessions cases);
Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2197 (1996)
(stating that due process had a "constitutional reign of thirty years").
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (seeking guidance
from the Court's confessions jurisprudence in resolving question of voluntariness in
Fourth Amendment consent search context).
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25
An J. CRIM. L. 310, 313 (1998).
Most commentators have focused on some version of Penney's first two
concerns. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 65 (1993)
[hereinafter GRANO, CONFESSIONS] ("In the view of most commentators, courts have
had two real reasons for excluding confessions as involuntary: (1) a desire, surviving
from the common-law approach, to eliminate untrustworthy confessions and (2) a
desire to control offensive police practices.").
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protecting the autonomy of the individual suspect.9 Of course,
the concerns were often intertwined, sometimes inextricably.
For example, in some cases the goals of avoiding false
confessions and deterring police misconduct were
complementary, as abhorrent police practices were often the
same tactics likely to produce unreliable confessions. 97
As police tactics moved beyond the uncontroversially
despicable to the more morally ambiguous, however, the line-
drawing became more difficult. As Professor Lesley A. Lunney
stated, "[i]n part, the difficulties with applying the
voluntariness standard to control psychological coercion were
the result of the Court's internal disagreements concerning the
proper balancing of the interests of suspect and society.
'9
Application of the due process test, pre-Miranda, led to bitter
divisions because of the virtual impossibility of reaching
concensus on the question: How much pressure on a suspect is
too much.9
In a pair of cases decided in 1964, Massiah v. United
States1" and Escobedo v. Illinois, °1 the Court invalidated two
confessions"°2 under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' °
Professor Louis Michael Seidman analyzed the Court's
attraction to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a desire
See Penney, supra note 94, at 313. Penney agues that the third concern,
referred to as the "self-determination theory," is "morally suspect" because "the idea
that criminal suspects should have an intrinsic, deontological right to silence fails to
accord with widely-held views of political and personal morality." Id. Cf R. Kent,
Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15
(1981) (suggesting that a suspect does not have moral "right to silence" in the face of
strong evidence of guilt).
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (invalidating confession
extracted by horrific physical abuse). For a more thorough discussion of the Brown
cases and others of that era, see Darmer, supra note 35. Cf Edith Rose Gardner,
Comment, Coerced Confessions of Prisoners of War, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 534-40
(1955) (detailing conditions endured by American prisoners of war in the Korean
conflict, some of whom made false confessions).
96 See Lunney, supra note 32, at 735.
Cf. Judge Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAL L. REV. 929, 955 (1965) ("[Tlhe very question is how far these [Bill
of Rights] safeguards extend. Five to four divisions within the Court afford no more
impressive evidence on that score than did those of thirty years ago with respect to the
due process and equal protection clauses.").
10D 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
101 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
102 For a thorough and penetrating analysis of the Escobedo case, see Gerald
Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1437-43 (1985).
103 These cases "worked together" with the Court's extension, the prior year, of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). Lunney, supra note 32, at 738.
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for certainty." In his words, "[v]oluntariness is a metaphysical
abstraction, but the presence or absence of counsel is a fact in
the world." °5
In Massiah, the defendant made damaging admissions
to his codefendant who, unbeknownst to Massiah, was a
government informant.'0° The Court held that federal agents
violated Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
they "deliberately elicited [the statements] from him after he
had been indicted ... .,,107 At that stage of the case, the Court
ruled, statements elicited from Massiah in the absence of his
counsel could not be used against him.' °8
The dissent protested that this new rule broke with the
traditional test for admitting confessions and would now
exclude admissions made to police, "no matter how voluntary
and reliable.""° In the dissent's view, "absence of counsel"
should be "one of several factors by which voluntariness is to be
judged," rather than a per se determinant requiring
suppression." °
One month later in Escobedo, the Court extended
Massiah's rule to pre-indictment stages of an investigation."'
Escobedo was the focus of a murder investigation, was in police
custody, was subject to interrogation designed to elicit
incriminating statements and was denied opportunities to
consult with his retained lawyer." 2 The police denied
Escobedo's repeated requests to consult with his lawyer, as well
as Escobedo's lawyer's repeated requests to consult with his
104 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL L. REV. 673, 734
(1992).
105 Id.
106 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202.
107 Id. at 206.
108 See id. at 206. "Massiah represents a pure right to counsel approach."
JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 414 (2000).
The triggering event for the attachment of the right is the commencement of adversary
proceedings, such as an arraignment or the filing of an indictment. See id. At that
point, the government is prohibited from "deliberately elicit[ing] incriminating
statements" from a suspect, "regardless of whether the individual is in 'custody' or
being subjected to 'interrogation' in the Miranda sense." Id. Of course, in Lindh's case,
he was not formally charged until he was returned to the United States. Accordingly, it
would have been the Miranda line of cases, rather than Massiah, that governed the
admissibility of his confession.
10 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Clark & Harlan,
JJ.).
110 Id. at 213.
111 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
112 Id. at 490-91.
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client."3 During the course of questioning, Escobedo implicated
himself in a murder plot, but he insisted that his associate had
fired the Tatal shots.1
4
The Court seemed particularly offended by the fact that
Escobedo "was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an
admission of 'mere' complicity in the murder plot was legally as
damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots. The 'guiding
hand of counsel' was essential to advise petitioner of his rights
in this delicate situation." 5 In addition, the majority suggested
that the officers' repeated urging of Escobedo to make a
statement "[w]ithout informing him of his absolute right to
remain silent,"1 6 and the officers' failure to "effectively warn[]
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent,"
contributed to the constitutional violation."7 Over strong
dissent, the Court found a violation of Escobedo's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
The majority dismissively responded to the dissent's
concern that providing counsel at this stage of a case would
invariably reduce the number of confessions. The Court stated:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there
is something very wrong with that system. 18
Despite its rhetorical force, Professor Gerald Caplan
called the Court's assertion "misleading because the right that
the Court was defending, far from being of long standing, was
newly discovered, indeed created, in this very opinion."" 9 In
Caplan's view, the Court discerned unfairness in the mere fact
that Escobedo did not fully appreciate the legal significance of
his statements, and it appeared to sympathize with Danny
Escobedo as an "underdog."1"' The Court implicitly suggested
that the defendant should be given a "sporting chance" to
113 Id. at 482. The police went so far as to tell Escobedo in response to his
requests for his attorney that his attorney did not want to see him. Id.
114 See id. at 482-83.
116 Id. at 486 (internal citations omitted).
16 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
.. Id. at 490-91.
" Id. at 490.
19 Caplan, supra note 102, at 1440.
12 Id. at 1441.
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escape guilt for his crimes, a suggestion that Caplan and others
denigrate.121
In recognizing a Sixth Amendment right t counsel
during custodial interrogation, the Escobedo decision had
profound and far-reaching implications. 122 In subsequent years,
the Court "recharacterized" Escobedo as vindicating rights
under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause1" and
limited the Escobedo holding to its facts.12 Nonetheless, the
Court's conception of a role for defense counsel in the
interrogation room was a radical, and not properly thoughtful,
development. Rather than insisting that government agents
simply refrain from unlawful practices, the Court in this era
imposed upon the government an affirmative obligation to
provide counsel to a suspect during a criminal investigation.12
121 See id. (discussing "sporting theory" of justice in writings of Wigmore,
Pound and Bentham). For a thorough critique of this theory, see GRANO, CONFESSIONS,
supra note 95, at 28-32.
As Professor Grano has put it, "if one takes Escobedo's reasoning seriously,
all police interrogation should be prohibited until the defendant has had an
opportunity to consult with a lawyer." Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the
Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1465, 1470 (1999) [hereinafter Grano, Selling the Ideal.
rm See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984) ("[W]e have
made clear that we required counsel in Miranda and Escobedo in order to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than to vindicate the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) ("[T]he
Court in retrospect perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate
the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.'") (citing Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966)).
12 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974) ("As we have noted
previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular
case."); see also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 ("Secondly, and perhaps even more important for
purely practical purposes, the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own
facts.").
1Z Miranda can be seen as a continuation of this trend, as it required the
government specifically to advise a suspect that he has a "right to an attorney." See
discussion infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text; cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing right to counsel during trial). As Professor Kamisar points
out:
James Thompson [who later became a law professor at Northwestern
University and then governor of Illinois], who had the distinction of
making the losing argument in [Escobedo], read it quite broadly. He
told a group of prosecuting attorneys attending a criminal law program
that... "[I]n dealing with [a suspect who, unlike Danny Escobedo,] has
not expressly indicated that he is aware of his right to counsel, absolute
cdmpliance with the Escobedo rule may well require a warning of the
right to counsel along with the warning of the privilege against self-
incrimination."
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 453 n.i. In this regard, Miranda carried forward the
vision of Escobedo. But see Seidman, supra note 104, at 744 (characterizing Miranda as
a "retreat from the promise of liberal individualism.., under the cover of bold advance.
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Because counsel could be relied upon to advise her client to
demur to questioning,'2 the Court essentially required the
government to thwart its own investigations.
On the heels of the Court's decisions in Escobedo and
Massiah, lawyers for Ernesto Miranda relied on the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments in urging reversal of his conviction.
1 2
But in Miranda v. Arizona," the Supreme Court adopted a
different approach,1" relying on the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.'3 The Court held that a custodial
confession would be presumed involuntary, and thus would be
inadmissible, if the police failed to give a suspect four specified
warnings, now widely recognized: that he has the right to
remain silent; that any statements he makes can be used
against him; that he has the right to an attorney during
From this perspective, the central point of Miranda was not the establishment of new
rights in the stationhouse. Escobedo, Massiah, and Culombe [v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961) (invalidating confession on due process grounds)] had already created all
the rights any defendant needed .... Miranda added . . . a mechanism by which the
defendant could give up these rights.").
See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances."); Seidman, supra note 104, at 734-35
("Virtually any competent lawyer would advise his client in the strongest possible
terms to remain silent, and it would be a rare client indeed who would disregard such
advice.").
See Paul C. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and
The Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 191 n.35 (1999) [hereinafter
Cassell, The Statute].
384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda opinion actually disposed of four
different cases, all of which involved confessions that were ultimately suppressed. See
id.
W See Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS
L. REV. 2001, 2003 (1998) (Miranda "established the most important new approach for
dealing with the constitutional admissibility of confessions.").
13 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 467. While this was the first time in the
twentieth century that the Court explicitly applied the Fifth Amendment to custodial
interrogation, the majority asserted that "our holding is not an innovation in our
jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other
settings." Id. at 442. But see id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's holding
today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth
Amendment, is at odds with American and English legal history, and involves a
departure from a long line of precedent."); cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497
(1964) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is incongruous to assume that the provision for
counsel in the Sixth Amendment was meant to amend or supersede the self-
incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment, which is now applicable to the States.
That amendment addresses itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions of an
accused and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements."). For a discussion of
the Court's earlier reliance on the Fifth Amendment in the nineteenth century, see
Darmer, supra note 35.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
questioning; and that an attorney will be appointed for him if
he cannot afford one.1
3 1
As Yale Kamisar noted, "Miranda . . .has been widely
criticized both for going too far and for not going far enough.""'
Regardless of its flaws, however, Dickerson indicates that
Miranda is here to stay.
III. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA JURISPRUDENCE
A. The "Second-Level" Miranda Safeguards: The Primacy of
the Right to Counsel
Miranda dictates that interrogators provide warnings of
two discrete rights: the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel."' If a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he gains
greater protections than if he had invoked his right to silence, a
development of the Court's post-Miranda jurisprudence that
"may have surprised the Miranda Court." "
Michigan v. Mosley"' involved the right to silence. An
officer read Mosley the Miranda warnings and began
questioning the suspect regarding one of two restaurant
13 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The scholarly discussion about the Miranda
decision itself is rich and full, and it is beyond the scope of this article to do anything
beyond providing the most cursory description of this landmark decision and the
controversy over its legitimacy. For fuller treatment of the decision, see Caplan, supra
note 102; Cassell, The Statute, supra note 127, at 183-94 (including in-depth account of
the underlying investigation and confession of Miranda based upon the first-hand
account of former Phoenix police Captain Carroll F. Cooley); Fred E. Inbau, "Playing
God" 5 to 4 (The Supreme Court and the Police), 57 J. CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL
SC. 377, 377 (1966); and Yale Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 59 (1966).
= Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the
Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 387 (2001)
[hereinafter Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later] (footnotes omitted); see also Cassell,
Supreme Court's Failures, supra note 27, at 918 ("Miranda's lack of proportionality is
shown not only by its overbroad reach in particular cases, but also by its unlimited
application."); Greenawalt, supra note 96, at 68 ("As the dissenters in Miranda clearly
recognized, the Miranda rules are not fully responsive to the concern that underlay
their creation."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CFI. L. REV.
435, 461 (1987) (arguing that Miranda's requirement that specified warnings be given
does not go far enough in protecting a suspect from compulsion). For a fuller discussion
of criticism of the majority opinion, see Darmer, supra note 35.
1 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
1M KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 521. Besides being technical, there is a
somewhat artificial nature to this distinction. Depending upon the precise words that a
suspect may happen to use in responding to the Miranda warnings, he may
unwittingly trigger one prong of the "second-level" safeguards as opposed to the other.
M 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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robberies.13 Mosley replied that he did not want to answer any
questions about the robberies. 137 The officer immediately
stopped the questioning and proceeded to complete the arrest
and booking process."3 That evening, a different officer
questioned Mosley-after again reading him the Miranda
warnings-regarding the murder of a man during a failed
holdup attempt in January. Mosley denied any involvement
until the officer falsely informed him that an accomplice had
implicated him. Mosley then implicated himself in the
shooting.'3
In interpreting Miranda, the Mosley Court determined
that when a suspect has invoked his right to silence, "[tihe
critical safeguard . . . is a person's 'right to cut off
questioning[,]'" and thus, the appropriate inquiry is "Whether
his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.'"'
4
The Court held that the first officer did honor the suspect's
right to end the questioning. Thus, the second officer was
entitled to re-initiate questioning several hours later on an
unrelated crime.
In Edwards v. Arizona," the Court elevated the "right
to counsel" strand of Miranda and provided greater protections
to a suspect who invokes his right to counsel than for one who
invokes his right to silence. In that case, Edwards was arrested
and informed of his Miranda rights.14 He agreed to submit to
questioning but, in the course of that questioning, said that he
wished to consult with an attorney.'4 The police did not provide
Edwards with counsel.' Instead, the next day, detectives
approached Edwards in jail. When Edwards said that he did
not want to talk, a guard told him he "had to."'4 Detectives
1'5 Id. at 97.
137 Id.
M Id.
189 Id. at 98.
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04.
1 Id. at 104-05. The dissent maintained that the January holdup attempt
may very well have been covered by the suspect's invocation of silence regarding
'robberies' and made light of the majority's assertion that the questioning was in a
different location when it was only a different location within the jail house. Id. at 118-
20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
"n Id. at 478.
'" See id. at 478-79.
145 Id. at 482.
146 Id. at 479, 482.
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gave Edwards fresh Miranda warnings, and this time he made
an incriminating statement. 147
The Court held that Edwards had not validly waived his
right to counsel and that his confession must be suppressed."
In addition, the Court established the rule that an accused,
"having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police." 49 In reaching its
holding, the Court relied on language in Miranda.'5°
The Edwards Court justified the distinction from
Mosley, explaining that it had noted in Mosley that the
Miranda Court had itself "distinguished between the
procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent
and a request for an attorney and had required that
interrogation cease until an attorney was present only if the
individual stated that he wanted counsel."5 '
As Dean Scott W. Howe pointed out in a recent article,
the predominance of the right to counsel over the right to
silence is an "ironic development in the Court's
jurisprudence."52 After all, the Court decided Miranda under
the auspices of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, which by its terms protects against "compelled" self-
incrimination and makes no reference to the assistance of
counsel whatever.1" The Sixth Amendment protects the right to
counsel, but has been traditionally interpreted to provide for
counsel in the trial context. Indeed, as Professor Grano argued,
neither the text of the Amendment nor its history:
support its extension to protect a suspect from the investigatory
process. The right to counsel evolved on the battleground of the
criminal trial; it sprang from complaints that a defendant without
counsel's assistance could not adequately defend himself in court
147 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479, 482.
148 See id. at 484, 487.
19 Id. at 484-85.
150 Id. at 485 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
151 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10).
152 Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV.
359, 402 (2001).
Im Cf. id. ("Miranda had created the new right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment privilege ostensibly as a protection for the central guarantee embodied in
the privilege-the right to silence.").
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against legal charges. The use of counsel to shield the defendant
from detection is fundamentally different, and is not supported by
the history of the right to counsel."
B. How Broad is the Miranda Right to Counsel?
Later cases ameliorated the effects of the Edwards rule
somewhat.' In Moran v. Burbine,'1 6 for example, the Court
held that, despite Miranda's admonition that a suspect be
advised of his right to counsel, the police were not obligated to
provide a suspect with specific information regarding the
availability of an attorney retained by his family in a case
where the suspect himself did not request counsel.1 57
In Burbine, the defendant was arrested and his sister
made efforts to reach a lawyer at the Public Defender's Office
to assist him.'5 An Assistant Public Defender called the police
station and explained that she represented Burbine. 59 The
police told the attorney that they were not going to question
Burbine, but then did.'6° Burbine was unaware of his sister's
efforts and the Assistant Public Defender's call. 16' Before he
gave a statement, Burbine was Mirandized and executed a
written waiver form stating that he did not want an attorney.
162
He later contended that, by failing to inform him of the
telephone call made by the attorney on his behalf, his
interrogators "deprived him of information essential to his
ability to knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment rights."' 63 The
15 Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 122, at 1488-89.
155 In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the Court held that the
Edwards prohibition did not apply in a case where a suspect invoked his right to
counsel but then, a few minutes later, asked, "What is going to happen to me now?" In
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the Court declined to extend the Edwards
rule when a suspect did not make an unambiguous request for counsel, but instead
said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." Id. at 455. The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice O'Connor for a 5-4 majority, held that "[ilf the statement fails to meet the
requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning
the suspect." Id. at 459. But see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding
Edwards prohibition applicable even where the suspect had been given the right to
confer with counsel).
15 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
157 See id. The applicability of Burbine to the Lindh case is addressed in
Glaberson, supra note 5.
158 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 416-417.
' Id. at 417.
180 Id.
161 Id.
16 Id. at 417-18.
16 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.
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Supreme Court disagreed, noting that there was no dispute
that the police had followed the Miranda requirements "with
precision" and that Burbine never requested an attorney.
64
C. The Prophylaxis Line of Cases and the Public Safety
Exception
In a relatively conservative era under Chief Justices
Burger and Rehnquist," the Court has taken pains to limit the
reach of Miranda.'6 In practice, the grand vision of Miranda
soared only on the pages of the majority opinion, and foundered
in the workaday world of competing considerations, such as
crime control. Significantly, later Courts created exceptions to
the requirement for warnings itself. For example, the Court
held that statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules
can be used to impeach a defendant who chooses to testify,'6
recognized a "public safety exception"1" and held that the
"fruits" of a Miranda violation need not be suppressed." It is
difficult to read this line of cases without concluding that they
were decided with an eye towards reaching a pre-determined
outcome, 70  that they reflect an exasperation with the
164 Id. at 420. In this regard, Lindh's allegations may have distinguished his
case from Burbine, although the government took issue with Lindh's claim that he
asked for an attorney. See supra Part I.
166 Cf Howe, supra note 152, at 376-77 (describing the mid-1960s as "the peak
of the Warren Court's liberal activism in criminal procedure").
166 See Garcia, supra note 22, at 462 ("Miranda has been . . .decimated by
judicially crafted qualifications and the public safety exception, and no longer serves as
the brake upon overzealous law enforcement that its progenitors intended.") (footnotes
omitted); Lunney, supra note 32, at 746 ("Rather than overturn Miranda, the Burger
and later Rehnquist Courts set about to limit its reach by interpreting Miranda's
requirements narrowly and crafting exceptions to its commands.").
16 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For a thorough and profoundly
critical analysis of the case, see Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 106-15. In Professor Stone's words:
Whatever one's views of the result in Harris, the opinion from
beginning to end, from the Court's treatment of the record, to its use of
precedent, to its analysis of policy, lacks candor, meticulousness, and
reasoned elaboration. In short, Harris was an exercise of raw judicial
power, with little or no effort made to explain or to justify its premises
or conclusions.
Id. at 114.
168 New York v. Quarles, 457 U.S. 649 (1984).
169 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). For instance, even if a suspect
makes a confession without the benefit of the warnings, a subsequent confession made
after the warnings are administered is admissible. Id.; cf Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
422 (1974).
170 See Lunney, supra note 32, at 796 ("There is little to suggest that the
Burger/Rehnquist Courts ever had an open mind concerning Miranda. As early as
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constraints of Miranda, and that they start from a premise
that Miranda was an illegitimate exercise of authority by a
more liberal activist Court.17 1 The rationale in many of those
limiting decisions was that the Miranda warnings-while
"prophylactic" rules designed to safeguard constitutional
rights -are not themselves constitutionally mandated.
1 2
The assertion that the Miranda warnings were
prophylactic in nature and not constitutionally required was
first made7  by then-Justice Rehnquist in Michigan v.
Tucker. 74 Tucker involved the admissibility of the testimony of
a witness identified through the defendant's responses to
questions that were not preceded by warnings. 175 The Tucker
Court treated the Miranda procedural safeguards as not
themselves required by the Constitution, but instead as
measures to ensure the protection of the right against
compulsory self-incrimination. 7 6 Ultimately, the Court found
that the "police conduct at issue here did not abridge
respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege."'77
The description of the Miranda rules as merely
"prophylactic" was a significant reconstitution of Miranda that
yanked the original opinion from its roots.178 Miranda, after all,
1974, in Tucker, the Burger Court's assault on Miranda's constitutional foundations
strongly foreshadowed the Court's desired destination.").
171 See id. at 798 ("Perhaps the Rehnquist and Burger Courts believed that
the Warren Court assumed too much authority, and therefore set out to weaken the
Court's institutional position intentionally through their treatment of Miranda and
other legacies of the Warren Court."); cf id. at 793-94 (considering, and then rejecting,
theory that Burger and Rehnquist Courts' approach "may... serve to distinguish the
inappropriate 'activisim' of the Warren Court, from the more measured and judicious
approaches of the later Courts") (footnotes omitted).
172 ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 108, at 357 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly
called the Miranda rules 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,' but only
'procedural safeguards' or 'prophylactic rules' designed to 'provide practical
reinforcement' for the privilege against self-incrimination.").
173 See id.
..4 See 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
175 See id. at 435. Police had arrested the defendant for rape and assault
before the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda, and the officers, though they had
asked the defendant whether he wanted an attorney, and also had told him that "any
statements he might make could be used against him," had not provided the additional
admonition, later required in Miranda, that an attorney would be provided for him if
he could not afford one. Id. at 436.
176 Id. at 443-44 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
17 Id. at 446.
178 See Garcia, supra note 22, at 464 (describing Court's "almost instant
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involved the reversal of a conviction in a state court over which
the federal courts have no supervisory power. 79 Justice Douglas
recognized this in Tucker in a powerful dissent:80 "The Court is
not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a
constitutional basis. We held the 'requirement of warnings and
waiver of rights (to be) fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege,' . . . and without so holding we would
have been powerless to reverse Miranda's conviction." 8'
Criticism aside, the characterization of the Miranda
warnings as "prophylactic" carried over to the Court's decision
in New York v. Quarles, where a sharply divided Court created
a "public safety" exception to Miranda's warnings
requirement. 182 In the underlying case, police arrested Quarles,
a man suspected of rape who fled into a supermarket.""
Quarles ran when he saw the police, but stopped when ordered
to do so by an officer with a drawn gun.'84 The officer who
frisked the suspect noticed that he was wearing an empty
shoulder harness and asked him for the location of the gun."
Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and
said, "the gun is over there.""
departure from its doctrinal foundation").
'79 Cf Lunney, supra note 32, at 749-50 (noting that the Tucker Court had
failed to explain how the Court could force the states to comply with Miranda if the
decision were not constitutional in origin).
180 Cf Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at 887 (characterizing dissent
as "forceful").
181 417 U.S. at 462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Professor Kamisar notes that
"Justice Douglas, then in his thirty-fifth year in the Court," reminded his younger
colleague, Rehnquist, of this. Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at 886.
Interestingly, in 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion reaffirming
Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, which itself relies upon the fact
that the federal courts have no supervisory power over the states. See Kamisar, From
Miranda, supra, note 24, at 889. ("It is not an exaggeration to say that the Chief
Justice's opinion in Dickerson, written a quarter-century after he wrote the opinion of
the Court in Tucker, reads almost as if he recently reread Justice Douglas's dissent in
Tucker and, on further reflection, decided that Douglas was right after all.").
18 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at 887
("Despite Justice Douglas's forceful dissent, the mischievous language in Tucker did not
go away. Indeed, it became quite significant."). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in Quarles. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting
opinion that was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. See id. at 674.
183 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651-52.
184 Id. at 652.
185 See id.
186 Id.
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In another Rehnquist opinion, the Supreme Court held
both the gun and the statements admissible,187 finding that
"this case presents a situation where concern for public safety
must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda."'8
The Court emphasized that there was no suggestion
that the statements at issue were "actually compelled by police
conduct which overcame [the defendant's] will to resist."1
89
Accordingly, the Court framed the issue as whether the officer
had been "justified in failing to make available to respondent
the procedural safeguards associated with the privilege against
self-incrimination since Miranda."19' The Court held that the
officer was justified, and that "the doctrinal underpinnings of
Miranda" do not require that it "be applied in all its rigor to a
situation" where questions are "reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety."'91 The Court found a public safety
risk inherent in the situation confronted by the officers,
because there was an "immediate necessity of ascertaining the
whereabouts of a gun."
1
The Rehnquist opinion drew a sharp dissent from three
other justices.19 Justice Marshall asserted that, in crafting a:
"public safety" exception to Miranda, the majority makes no attempt
to deal with the constitutional presumption established by that case.
... Without establishing that interrogations concerning the public
safety are less likely to be coercive than other interrogations, the
majority cannot endorse the "public-safety" exception and remain
faithful to the logic of Miranda v. Arizona.1'
In the dissent's view, authorities faced with a genuine
emergency that demands immediate answers are not
confronted with a dilemma. Rather:
187 See id. at 651, 653. In addition to the statement "the gun is over there,"
lower courts had suppressed other statements, made after Quarles was Mirandized, on
the ground that those statements were "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 659-60. That
holding, too, was rejected. Id.
188 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
189 Id. at 654.
190 Id. at 654-55.
191 Id. at 656.
192 Id. at 657.
19 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan
and Stevens joined the Marshall dissent. Id. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. She would have admitted the gun but
suppressed the initial statement. See id. at 673-74.
194 Id. at 684 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise imminently
imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects without
advising them of their constitutional rights. . . . If trickery is
necessary to protect the public, then the police may trick a suspect
into confessing. While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits on
such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in
Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of emergency questioning.
All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced
statements at trial."6
Thus, according to the dissent, the police should ask
their questions. The answers, however, should not be
admissible against the defendant in court.
D. The Dickerson Decision and the Future of Quarles
The Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United
States19 has the potential to undermine the stability of Quarles
and the rest of the Court's prophylaxis line of jurisprudence. In
Dickerson, the Court confronted the question of Miranda's
constitutional underpinnings head-on, ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute,19 passed by Congress in the wake
of Miranda,19 that used a "totality of the circumstances test" to
determine whether a confession was coerced.'9 To the surprise
196 Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545 (1977) (Sixth Amendment violated only if trial affected)). Justice O'Connor made a
similar point in her concurring opinion:
Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking
questions to secure the public safety. Rather, the critical question
Miranda addresses is who shall bear the cost of securing the public
safety when such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or
the State. . . . When police ask custodial questions without
administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires
that the answers be presumed compelled and that they be excluded
from evidence at trial.
Id. at 664 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
197 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
19 Though passed in 1968, the statute had been little used, in part because of
conflicts within the Justice Department as to its constitutionality. See Yale Kamisar,
Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 469
(1999) ("As Justice Scalia pointed out recently, § 3501 'has been studiously avoided by
every Administration... since its enactment more than 25 years ago."') (citing Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)). As a former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, I can represent that
that office did not rely upon the statute during the period I was employed there. But see
Cassell, The Statute, supra note 127, at 197-208 (disagreeing with "conventional
wisdom" that Justice Department has consistently had doubts about constitutionality
of § 3501).
"9 As discussed in Part II, Miranda establishes an irrebutable presumption
that all unwarned statements are coerced. Section 3501 would have allowed the courts
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of some, the Supreme Court rejected the statute in favor of
Miranda."' While not explicitly holding that the Miranda
warnings themselves are constitutionally required, the Court
referred to Miranda as a "constitutional decision" that
Congress cannot overrule.2"' According to the Court, because
the statute essentially reinstated the due process voluntariness
test that the Court used before Miranda, it failed to provide a
constitutionally adequate substitute for the Miranda
safeguards 202
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longstanding detractor of
Miranda, wrote the opinion for a 7-2 majority.' He "concede[d]
that there is language in some of our opinions that supports
the view" that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally
required,2 but found that the "foremost" factor supporting the
view of Miranda as a "constitutional decision" was the fact that
the Court had consistently applied the Miranda requirements
to the states over which the Court has no supervisory power."
Acknowledging that cases, such as Quarles, had created
exceptions to Miranda, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
other decisions had broadened the application of Miranda.2 In
the Court's view, those cases "illustrate the principle-not that
to weigh the lack of warnings against other factors in determining whether a
confession was actually coerced. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2002).
200 The Dickerson decision, like Miranda, has received exhaustive treatment
by notable constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later,
supra note 132; Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law,
99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001). The intent of this article is to give simply an abbreviated
description of the Dickerson case and to focus on the continued viability of the 'public
safety" exception in its wake.
201 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428.
Id. at 442-43.
Some have speculated that Justice Rehnquist assigned the opinion to
himself as a form of damage control. See Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at
889 (describing common speculation that, when Chief Justice Rehnquist realized that
six of his colleagues were prepared to reaffirm Miranda, he assigned the opinion to
himself "rather than let it go to someone like John Paul Stevens, probably the strongest
champion of Miranda on the Court"; this explanation assumes the Chief Justice would
have voted the other way if his colleagues had been split 4-4).
204 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
205 See id. The fact that the Court has no supervisory power over the state
courts had been, of course, the basis of Justice Douglas's dissent in Tucker, where
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, had first described the Miranda rules as
prophylactic. See Kamisar, From Miranda supra note 24, at 889 ("It is not an
exaggeration to say that the Chief Justice's opinion in Dickerson, written a quarter-
century after he wrote the opinion of the Court in Tucker, reads almost as if he recently
reread Justice Douglas's dissent in Tucker and, on further reflection, decided that
Douglas was right after all.").
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976);
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)).
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Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
constitutional rule is immutable."27
Finally, the Court determined that principles of stare
decisis militated strongly against judicially overruling Miranda
then, even if that Court might have decided Miranda
differently. According to the majority, "[tihe warnings have
become part of our national culture."2 The opinion baffled
many and satisfied almost no one.2'
In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Scalia derided the
majority for describing Miranda as a "constitutional" decision
without determining that the Constituion actually required
Miranda warnings.21° In his view, the initial Miranda decision
was flawed, and he emphasized that subsequent cases have
interpreted the decision as announcing "only 'prophylactic'
rules."21' In light of the prophylaxis line of cases, Scalia found
that it is "no longer possible" for the Court to conclude that a
mere violation of the Miranda rules itself violates the
Constitution.212 Thus, the Court could not disregard a law
passed by Congress.213 Responding to the majority's description
of the Miranda rules as mutable, he said:
The issue . . . is not whether court rules are "mutable"; they
assuredly are.... The issue is whether, as mutated and modified,
they must make sense. The requirement that they do is the only
thing that prevents this Court from being some kind of nine-headed
Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome,
case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy. And if confessions
procured in violation of Miranda are confessions "compelled" in
violation of the Constitution, the post-Miranda [prophylaxis line ofi
decisions I have discussed do not make sense."4
As Justice Scalia's Dickerson dissent vigorously
demonstrates, the status of the prophylaxis line of cases is now
uncertain, because those cases are premised on a rationale that
2M Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
2W Id. at 443.
209 The Michigan Law Review, for example, hosted a symposium in which a
number of prominent confessions law scholars were critical of the decision. See, e.g.,
Cassell, Supreme Court's Failures, supra note 27, at 898 (recalling his "incredulity"
upon reading the opinion); Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at 879; Klein, supra
note 27, at 1071 (describing opinion as "terrible").
210 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's dissent was
joined by Justice Thomas. See id.
211 Id. at 450.
212 Id. at 454.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 455.
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has now been implicitly rejected. As Professor George C.
Thomas III points out, "[i]f Miranda is best understood, in light
of Dickerson, as constitutional in the strong sense, the
exceptions and doctrinal limitations made on the authority of
the prophylactic theory seem doomed."215 Though the Dickerson
majority explicitly "embraced the entire doctrinal
superstructure created with the prophylactic understanding," it
did so in dicta, "and it might be that Dickerson is the beginning
of the end for some or all of those doctrinal limitations."26
If the Court were committed to an internally consistent
Miranda and confessions law jurisprudence, the prophylaxis
line would have to give way to the revivified interpretation of
Miranda provided by Dickerson.217 The majority in Dickerson,
however, appears content to have it both ways: interpreting
Miranda as constitutional and sustaining the viability of those
218
cases premised on the opposite view. Moreover, while the
Dickerson language approving the prophylaxis line is no more
than dicta, it is dicta subscribed to by a formidable majority of
seven on the Supreme Court.
IV. EXTENDING THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION TO
EDWARDS: APPLICATIONS TO THE TERRORIST CASES
Since Quarles, the Supreme Court has not addressed
the potential scope of the public safety exception. 2" The state
and lower federal courts, however, have applied the exception
21 George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless:
Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICR L. REV. 1081, 1090 (2001).
216 Id.; cf. Kamisar, From Miranda, supra note 24, at 894 ("Encouraged by
Dickerson, defense lawyers will try hard to restore Miranda to its original vigor."). But
see id. ("But they are likely to discover that, although Dickerson seemingly repudiated
the premises on which some Miranda-debilitating decisions are based, the exceptions
to Miranda are going to remain in place.").
217 Justice Scalia essentially makes this point in his Dickerson dissent. 530
U.S. at 454-55. Cf. Klein, supra note 27, at 1030-31 ("The Miranda conundrum runs
something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional
interpretation... the impeachment and 'fruits' exceptions to Miranda should fall.").
218 See Dripps, supra note 24, at 35 ("gist" of Dickerson compromise opinion is
"that the status quo will be maintained. The existing law, however, is regarded by
virtually every informed observer as inconsistent and unprincipled").
219 In Quarles itself, the Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), in which the Court found impermissible questions about a
gun there were unrelated to an immediate safety threat. See United States v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984). "The Court, however, has not had further occasion to
explicate the boundary between exigent questioning in the interest of the public safety
and ordinary investigatory questioning." United States v. Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d 617,
625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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to an expanding variety of cases, such as hostage takings.m
Given the current national preoccupation with security in the
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, a court is far more
likely to read the public safety exception expansively.
In 2000, the Second Circuit specifically approved the
use of the Quarles exception in a case involving a terrorist
plot.21 In United States v. Khalil, defendant Abu Mezer and
codefendant Khalil were both shot and wounded during a raid
on their apartment in which the police discovered pipe
bombs.2 While Abu Mezer was at the hospital receiving
treatment for his wounds,m officers questioned him "as to how
many bombs there were, how many switches were on each
bomb, which wires should be cut to disarm the bombs, and
whether there were any timers."2' The officers questioned Abu
Mezer without Mirandizing him,2 and he responded to the
questions.m In addition, in response to a question whether he
"had planned to kill himself in the explosion," Abu Mezer
"responded simply, 'Poof.'27
The district court ruled that the public safety exception
applied.m On appeal, the defendant only challenged' the
introduction of his statement, "Poof," in response to the
question whether he had intended to commit suicide.m He
argued that the question regarding his plan to kill himself was
2W See, e.g., Howard v. Garvin, 844 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); State v.
Finch, 975 P.2d 67 (Wash. 1999); see also People v. Mayfield, 938 P.2d 485, 520-22 (Cal.
1997) (citing to list of hostage line of cases). Some courts have crafted a public safety
exception, while others make use of the rescue doctrine.
2' See United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. They discovered the bombs after an informant told them that defendant
Abu Mezer was "very angry because of what happened between Jerusalem and
Palestine" and planned forthwith to detonate bombs that they were keeping in their
apartment. Id. at 115. Abu Mezer and codefendant Khalil were both shot and wounded
during a raid on the apartment in which one of the men lunged at one of the officers,
grabbing the officer's gun and grappling with the officer; the other man crawled
towards a bag that the officers believed (rightly, as it turned out) contained a bomb.
After officers observed wiring in the bag, technicians found pipe bombs, including one
on which a switch had been flipped, and they "were concerned that the bomb would
explode before they could disarm it." Id.
See id. at 115, 121.
' Id. at 115.
2' Id. at 121.
Khalil, 214 F.3d at 121.
2n Id.
See id.
The defendant also challenged the statement on voluntariness grounds. Id.
230Id.
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"unrelated to public safety."21  While not unequivocally
supporting the government's view, the Second Circuit noted
that it was "inclined to disagree" with defendant's argument,
"given that Abu Mezer's vision as to whether or not he would
survive his attempt to detonate the bomb had the potential for
shedding light on the bomb's stability." 2 If a statement can be
admissible under Quarles on this basis alone, it augurs the
potential for a significant expansion of the public safety
exception.
In a post-Dickerson case, United States v. Jones, the
Southern District of New York discussed the continued
viability of Quarles. While noting that the Rehnquist opinion in
Dickerson "disavowed the implication in Quarles and other
opinions of its vintage that the Miranda warnings are not
mandated by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,"2 4 Judge Gerald Lynch' found, nonetheless, "no
suggestion in Dickerson that Quarles and other exceptions to
Miranda have been overruled."2 6
The Jones opinion is instructive in analyzing the
appropriate scope of Quarles. Judge Lynch noted that the
Second Circuit's recent Khalil decision2 7 did "little to test the
limits of the Quarles exception," because "the exigent risks to
public safety" in Khalil were more extreme even than in
Quarles itself."2 Judge Lynch explained, "confronted with a
bomb that might or might not be about to explode, no rational
person could think that the police, before questioning the
23' Khalil, 214 F.3d at 121.
= Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Second Circuit ruled that
introduction of that statement was "at worst" harmless error, even if that court took a
"different view as to the relevance" of the question regarding Abu Mezer's contemplated
suicide. Id.
154 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding Quarles applied when
authorities had specific reason to believe that a gun was present and objectively
reasonable basis for belief that child might find it).
2M Id. at 623 n.7.
Judge Lynch is the former Chief of the Criminal Division in the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and a professor at
Columbia Law School. He has written extensively on matters involving criminal
procedure. See, e.g., Gerald E. Lynch, Our Adminstrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998); Gerald E. Lynch, Toward a Model Penal Code,
Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 295 (1998);
and Gerald E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769 (1990).
Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 623 n.7.
See supra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
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bomb's maker about its characteristics, must advise the bomber
in effect that it behooves him to consult counsel before
answering." Noting that other courts have split over the
question how broadly to read the Quarles exception, ° Judge
Lynch then applied Quarles to the drug case before him. In
Jones, the authorities had "some specific reason, beyond
generalizations about drug dealers, to think a gun was
present"2" and "an objectively reasonable" basis for concern
that a young child "could be endangered."'2
As Judge Lynch's Jones opinion demonstrates, most of
the hard cases involving Quarles, thus far, have involved
garden variety cases in which the authorities question drug
dealers about the presence of guns.m Questions designed to
disable terrorist bombs, such as were present in Khalil, present
a relatively easy application of Quarles. Along those lines, if
Lindh had been questioned before being given Miranda
warnings in an effort to learn about impending terrorist plots
of which he had clear knowledge, the questioning would almost
certainly have passed muster under Quarles, because it would
have been designed to defuse a concrete, immediate threat.
Had he not pled guilty, however, Lindh's case would not
have been so straightforward. In some ways Lindh was unlike
the defendant Abu Mezer in Khalil, who specifically knew
about disabling a bomb present in his very apartment. When
the authorities approached Abu Mezer, they were virtually
certain that he personally had knowledge that was vital to
their ability to disarm a terrorist bomb. The presence of that
bomb was not a matter of speculation; police officers had seen
it in the defendant's apartment. Lindh presented the much
harder situation where the suspect may have had information
critical to the public safety.
One possible way to deal with the more speculative
public safety cases would be to balance the likelihood that the
suspect has the information with the importance of the
information. The more potentially important the information,
= Id. at 628. Of course, critics of the original Quarles decision would counter
that the real question is not whether the suspect should be questioned without
warnings or not. The real question is whether the government can later use those
unwarned statements against the defendant at trial. See discussion of dissenting and
concurring opinions in Quarles supra Part III.C.
240 Jones, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 626-28.
241 Id. at 629.
22 Id .
SSee id. at 626-28.
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the less tolerable it seems to formulate rules that require
authorities to bypass questioning a detainee.2" If there were
even a .0001 percent chance that a suspect like Lindh had
information about another terrorist plot akin to the World
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, does it make sense to say
that he must first be given Miranda warnings? Is there really a
constitutional requirement that they be provided? What does it
mean to say after Dickerson, that Miranda warnings are
"constitutionally required," and yet, that there are exceptions
to the requirement?
If a suspect asks for an attorney after being Mirandized,
as Lindh says he did, then Edwards is implicated, i.e., the rule
requiring that all questioning must cease after a suspect
invokes his right to counsel.' The Supreme Court has never
confronted the question whether there is a public safety
exception to Edwards. If one accepts the legitimacy of Quarles,
it is logical to extend the Quarles rationale to Edwards
situations.2"
Two courts of appeal specifically extended the Quarles
exception to Edwards situations.24 In United States v.
Mobley,' the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a
suppression motion by Judge Thomas Selby Ellis, III-the
same judge who presided over the Lindh case. The Mobley
court relied on the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in United
States v. DeSantis.2 9
Some have suggested that, in extreme cases, even traditional due process
concerns should give way to the need for information. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz,
Op-Ed, The Parallels Between Us and Israel on Terrorism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26,
2001, at A23 ("there are voices within our own FBI seeking authority to use torture to
learn of imminent terrorist threats"); cf. Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes, It Should Be "On the
Books," BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15 ("Unless we are prepared to authorize
the issuance of a torture warrant in the case of the ticking bomb, we should not torture,
even if that means that innocent people may die. If we want to prevent the death of
hundreds of innocent people by subjecting one guilty person to non-lethal pain, then we
must find a way to justify this exception to the otherwise blanket prohibition on
torture."). But see Philip B. Heymann, Op-Ed, Torture Should Not be Authorized,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15 (arguing that torture should never be permitted).
See infra Part III.A.
Similarly, the Court's post-Miranda jurisprudence permits the government
to impeach a defendant with statements taken in violation of Miranda. See Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
27 United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
W4 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Mobley, 818 F. Supp.
164 (E.D. Va. 1993).
U 870 F.2d 536.
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In DeSantis, officers executed an arrest warrant at the
defendant's home. DeSantis maintained that as soon as he
answered the door, found out about the arrest warrant and was
read his Miranda rights, he asked to call his attorney to "see if
the matter could be straightened out, but was refused.""
DeSantis then asked if he could change his clothes, indicating
that his clothes were in the other room. The officers assented,
but they first questioned whether there were any weapons in
the bedroom. This question lead to DeSantis's affirmative
response and, ultimately, disclosure of the location of a gun.21
In urging suppression, DeSantis suggested that Quarles
had absolutely no application after Miranda warnings were
given. 2 The government, on the other hand, maintained that
Quarles not only served as an exception to the requirement for
Miranda warnings, but also as an exception to the
voluntariness inquiry.253 The court disagreed with both parties
and instead considered whether the public safety exception
applied in situations where the accused had invoked his right
to counsel. In so doing, the court confronted the question
whether "the considerations undergirding Quarles
necessitate[d] relaxation of certain procedural safeguards
enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona .... "2m
In extending the public safety exception to these facts,
the court relied on reasoning in Quarles suggesting that the
procedural safeguards of Miranda were not required in
instances where the social cost of those safeguards is more
than merely obtaining admissible evidence. 5 In the court's
view, Edwards's procedural safeguards likewise had to give
25 Id. at 537. What occurred during the execution of the warrant was
disputed; however, the court of appeals determined that the dispute was not dispositive
and credited the defendant's account while affirming the denial of the suppression
motion. Id. at 538 n. 1.
"' See id. at 540.
252 Id.
2W Id.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 538. DeSantis failed in his attempts to distinguish
Quarles factually from his case. The court easily dismissed two of DeSantis's
arguments based on the outcome of United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.
1987). See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 539. The court, based on Brady, determined that the
fact that the officers had no reason to believe the defendant was unarmed was of "no
consequence," and the "mere fact that the arrest did not take place in public" was also
irrelevant. What was relevant was "whether there was 'an objectively reasonable need
to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger.'" Id. at 539 (citing
United States v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984)) (emphasis supplied in
DeSantis).
DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541.
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way in the face of "[s]ociety's need to procure the information
about the location of a dangerous weapon ... ""
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officers were
legally entitled to question DeSantis regarding the location of
the gun for their own safety, and that under the totality of the
circumstances, the facts demonstrated that the officers did not
coerce DeSantis's responses. Therefore, the statements and the
firearm were "properly admitted into evidence." 7
In Mobley, eight FBI agents arrested defendant Mobley
at his home.2 As the Fourth Circuit explained, when the
agents "determined that Mobley was alone, the officers seemed
to relax. Mobley had answered the door naked, and it was quite
apparent that he was unarmed." 9 One df the agents advised
Mobley of his Miranda rights, and Mobley invoked his right to
counsel, thereby implicating Edwards. ° Mobley was then
advised that his home would be searched and was asked
whether there was anything that "could be of danger to the
agents."2' Mobley admitted that there was a weapon in a closet
and led the agents to it.'
Judge Ellis denied Mobley's motion to suppress, on the
authority of Quarles.m The Fourth Circuit noted that whether
a public safety exception applied to Edwards was then a
question of first impression in that circuit.2 After reviewing
the rationale of Quarles, the court found that the public safety
exception should be extended to Edwards cases.2 While
acknowledging that Quarles was "not on all points with the
situation in which the accused has claimed his right to counsel,
the danger ... from hidden traps and discarded weapons is as
evident after the Miranda warnings have been given as
256 Id.
2 Id. The circumstances the court considered under the totality test were: (1)
DeSantis was questioned in his own home rather than in the coercive environment of
the police station; (2) the officers questioned DeSantis only in response to his request to
enter the bedroom; and (3) the officers' questions were not designed, from an objective
standpoint, to elicit testimonial evidence, but instead were designed to secure the
officers' safety. Id.
2W United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1994).
259 Id.
2 See id.
21 Id. at 691.
MId.
2M See Mobley, 40 F.3d at 691.
2 Id.
See id. at 692.
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before."' Moreover, "[tihe same considerations that allow the
police to dispense with providing Miranda warnings in a public
safety situation also would permit them to dispense with the
prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating further
questioning of an accused who requests counsel."2 7
The Fourth Circuit's recognition of a public safety
exception to Edwards was essentially dicta, because it
ultimately found that the newly-minted exception should not
be applied on the facts before it in Mobley.' The Court stated:
As noted, Mobley was encountered naked; by the time he was
arrested, the FBI already had made a security sweep of his premises,
and they had found that he was the sole individual present....
Although we believe that the public safety exception is a valid and
completely warranted exception to the Miranda and Edwards rules,
we are persuaded that there was no demonstration of an "immediate
need" that would validate protection under the Quarles exception in
this instance. Absent an objectively reasonable concern for
immediate danger to police or public, we must follow the rule, not
the exception."
Creating a new public safety exception that was not
being applied in that case, the court did not fully analyze why
Quarles should be extended to cases where warnings have
already been given. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, Quarles
reflected a concern that giving warnings would have the
immediate effect of deterring a suspect from providing vital
information. As the Quarles Court put it:
[11f the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings
before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles'
position might well be deterred from responding. . . . Here, had
Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer
Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would
have been something more than merely the failure to obtain
evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an
answer to his question.., to insure that further danger to the public
did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area. 0
Once warnings are provided, the rationale underlying
Quarles, that is, the determination that where public safety is
W Id.
Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.
1989)).
Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693. However, the court further found that the district
court's admission of the statement was harmless error. See id. at 694.
2 Id. at 693.
270 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
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at stake, you cannot afford to give the warnings because the
suspect may heed them and not provide vital information, does
not apply.271
However, an equally compelling rationale for a public
safety exception exists. By invoking his right to counsel, a
suspect implicitly suggests that he has been deterred from
providing information. Whereas, under Quarles, the
government speculates that a suspect may invoke his rights
and judges that possibility too costly, in a "public safety"
situation where a suspect is warned and invokes his right to
counsel, the risk is no longer speculative. Rather, the suspect
has already communicated that he will not provide information
before consulting with a lawyer. While Edwards would demand
that the government make no further efforts, that rule-no
less than Miranda's warnings requirement- should give way
to the exigencies of public safety. 2
Indeed, one could plausibly argue that Edwards is more
susceptible to an exception than Miranda. Miranda suggests
that unwarned statements are compelled. No such rationale
underlies treating the invocation of the right to counsel
differently than the invocation of the right to silence.
On the other hand, a defendant like Lindh could counter
that the government, after telling him he had a right to
counsel, "reneged" by persistently questioning him in the face
of that invocation. In other words, the argument goes, breaking
a promise made is worse than not making the promise in the
first place.7 3 However, telling someone he has a "right to an
attorney" does not necessarily imply that the government must
permanently refrain from asking further questions if the
suspect invokes that right.' 6 The suspect still has the right to
21 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692 n.1.
Indeed, if the public safety exception is not extended to Edwards, the
government is essentially punished if it does not take an expansive view of Quarles.
That is, if an officer or agent errs on the side of providing warnings in a case where
Quarles might have permitted him to dispense with the warnings, he would lose the
ability to "correct the mistake" later if the public safety exception were not extended to
Edwards cases.
273 Cf Gayne v. Coughlin, 995 F. Supp. 268, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("When a
suspect is told that he has a right to remain silent, invokes his right, but is then
questioned again, the suspect would have reason to believe that any further attempt to
invoke the right to remain silent would be fruitless."), afrd sub nom., Gayne v.
McClellan, 129 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 1997).
274 Cf Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (White, J., concurring)
("[Tihe statement in Miranda requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the
'right to silence' tells us nothing because it does not indicate how soon this
interrogation may resume.") (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
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remain silent, and can choose to do so until he consults with a
lawyer.
Given the fact that two circuit courts have already
approved the principle of extending Quarles to Edwards, it
appears likely that other courts will hold that, even if suspects
like Lindh invoke their right to counsel, the Edwards rule
should give way in exigent circumstances. Those rulings would
be justified. Indeed, the courts should read a public safety
exception to Edwards more expansively than did the Fourth
Circuit in Mobley, recognizing that an exception is justified
even if an "immediate" need cannot be easily demonstrated.
The public interests at stake are far more compelling in
cases like Lindh than they were in Mobley.276 If the FBI and
other officials interrogating Lindh did so based on a reasonable
belief that questioning might yield information vital to the
public interest, then such questioning should be within the
scope of the public exception articulated in Quarles, even if
Edwards would otherwise apply.2 77 Recall, in this connection,
the expansive language adopted by the Second Circuit in
Khalil.275 In that case, the court suggested that if the answer to
a question had the potential even for "shedding light" on the
danger (there, the stability of a bomb), then it might pass
muster under Quarles. Regardless of the quality or importance
of the information ultimately garnered from Lindh, at the time
he was being interrogated it was surely plausible that he
25 In the case of foreign interrogation, such as that involved in Lindh's case,
there may be an additional argument. In Lindh's case, the government's alleged
statements that no lawyers were available in Afghanistan may well have been
factually correct. The courts have never gone so far as to hold that the "right to
counsel" means the right to counsel immediately. Though Miranda requires the
government to either provide counsel or cease questioning in the face of an invocation,
Miranda contemplated routine, stationhouse questioning, not foreign interrogation.
There is no reason why Miranda should not be read narrowly when, in fact, defense
counsel are not readily available. Cf. Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (finding
that warnings were adequate in case where officer advised defendant that "[wie have
no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and
when you go to court.").
276 Cf. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Skies Won't Be Safe Until We Use Commonsense
Profiling, NAT'L J., Mar. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7094821 (discussing the high
stakes involved in airport screening where the goal is to avoid air disaster).
27 In the Lindh case, the government argued that military questioning done
for the purpose of gathering military intelligence is simply not subject to the Miranda
rules. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. That is a compelling argument, but
the need for an exception to Edwards is broader than the need to exempt military
questioning.
Z7 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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possessed information that potentially could shed light on an
ongoing terrorist threat.
Finally, lower courts, following the lead of Judge Lynch
in the Jones case, will likely interpret the Dickerson decision as
leaving intact the exceptions to Miranda, including the public
safety exception. Once the ongoing viability of the underlying
public safety exception to Miranda is accepted, the public
safety exception can be extended to Edwards on an expanded
Mobley analysis.
Given the Supreme Court's strong signal that it is
"business as usual" with regard to the entrenched Miranda
exceptions, it is not the job of the lower courts to reconcile that
dictum with the Court's seemingly contradictory interpretation
of the "constitutional" nature of the Miranda decision.7 9 In the
short run, the public safety exception of Quarles can be
extended to Edwards situations on the "expanded Mobley
analysis" suggested above. In the longer run, however, we
should strive for a more comfortable doctrinal home for public
safety exceptions than the unsatisfying ipse dixit of the
Dickerson majority."s
One solution would be a frank recognition that, if the
Fifth Amendment requires Miranda warnings, and Quarles
permits courts to use statements not preceded by such
warnings, that is justified simply because "the Fifth
Amendment itself must yield to public safety issues."28 This
reasoning seems to me unsatisfactory in light of the language
of the Fifth Amendment itself, which does not suggest that
society's "need" for a "compelled" statement can be balanced
against an absolute prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination.2'
Cf Dripps, supra note 24, at 77 ("[L]ower courts clearly cannot ... reorient
criminal procedure doctrine"; suggesting that more "general doctrinal foundations"
after Dickerson can come only from the Supreme Court.).
m See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional
Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 70 (contending that Justice Scalia's dissent in
Dickerson is "on firm ground . . . in criticizing the majority's frequent resort to ipse
dixit"); Klein, supra note 27, at 1071 (referring to Chief Justice Rehnquist's holding in
Dickerson as "judicial fiat that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson"); cf.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 500 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting) (referring to the
majority opinion in Miranda as "ipse dixit").
281 Klein, supra note 27, at 1062 (offering possible justification for Quarles).
M But see Dorf & Friedman, supra note 280, at 79 n.77 ("Few rights are
absolute, and all Quarles does is to acknowledge that some balancing is appropriate.");
see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (dealing with "fighting
words" exception to First Amendment freedom of speech). Some rights, however, have
been read as absolute. The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision, for example,
2002]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
But does that necessarily mean that the public safety
exception is itself unconstitutional? If society really needs
information from a suspect, does dispensing with Miranda as a
way to obtain that information violate the Constitution? I
suspect that strict defenders of Miranda would argue-as
Justice Marshall did in Quarles-that the dilemma I have
posed is somewhat artificial. They would surely agree that
interrogators should ask all the questions required to defuse
any real emergency, whether it be one involving national
security or a more pedestrian one involving a gun in a grocery
store. However, in their view, the government should bear the
"cost" of that questioning, with the "cost" being forfeiture of the
use of any statements elicited during the emergency
questioning.28 But, why should the government pay any such
"cost" when it has acted rationally, perhaps even brilliantly, in
preventing some act of destruction that the questions pre-
empted? The answer, as the argument goes, is that the
introduction into evidence of these "compelled" statements
violates the defendant's constitutional right against self-
incrimination.'
Marshall's dissent in Quarles, and arguments derived
therefrom, are faithful to the rationale of Miranda. They serve,
however, to illustrate the dubious foundations upon which that
decision rests: (1) the presumption that any unwarned
statements are coerced and (2) the assumption that subjecting
a person to police interrogation is the same as compelling him
to be "a witness against himself' at a criminal trial. In short,
one can believe that the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is absolute without believing that the Miranda
rights are absolute. The question is one of defining the scope of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
For example, even in a situation where "public safety"
would be served by forcing a defendant to testify against
hiniself at trial (perhaps because, for example, such testimony
would more readily lead to the conviction of a dangerous
perpetrator), I would argue that the Fifth Amendment
absolutely forbids forcing that person to testify. I suspect few
is not set aside even in the most serious cases.
283 While Justice Marshall essentially made this point in his dissenting
opinion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), it was Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion, who explicitly made the reference to "cost" 467 U.S. at 664. See
supra note 195 and accompanying text.
28 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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people would disagree, and yet, many agree with the validity of
Quarles. Why? Because Miranda really did go "beyond" the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment,' despite Dickerson's
suggestion otherwise.
However, any suggestion that Miranda be cast aside
wholesale, post-Dickerson, is purely academic. On the other
hand, Miranda itself did not hold that statements made after
warnings are given and a suspect invokes his right to counsel
(the Edwards situation) are necessarily compelled.
One solution to the "public safety problem" involves
Congress. Although the Dickerson Court found Section 3501 to
be unconstitutional, that was in part because that statute did
nothing more than displace Miranda with the pre-existing test
that Miranda itself held inadequate.95 Professors Michael C.
Dorf and Barry Friedman have argued that the Court would be
obligated to give "serous consideration" to legislation consistent
with "what Dickerson identified as Miranda's core holding: that
the Fifth Amendment requires 'apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and... assuring a continuous opportunity
to exercise it."'' 7 Under Dorf and Friedman's hypothetical
legislation, the public safety exception to Edwards would be
unnecessary. While not motivated specifically by the public
safety concerns addressed here, their hypothetical legislation
actually forbids the presence of counsel at pre-charge
interrogation sessions.m Legislation would not have to go that
far to vindicate the public safety exception at issue here.
Joseph Grano has made this argument in particularly compelling terms.
See Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 122, at 1497-98.
See Doff & Freidman, supra note 280, at 72 (characterizing § 3501 as a
'slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to slap back, it was this one") (citing
Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 895
(2000) [hereinafter Kamisar, Overrule] for characterization of § 3501); Garcia, supra
note 22, at 479 (describing statute as "in effect decreeing the return of the
voluntariness standard Miranda had jettisoned"); Kamisar, Overrule, supra at 951
("Congress chose not to replace the Miranda warnings with a credible substitute.
Instead... Congress contented itself with making the pre-Miranda voluntariness test
the sole test for admissibility of confessions."); Klein, supra note 27, at 1057 ("Congress
enacted 18 U.S. Code § 3501 in 1968 not in response to [the Court's] request for
alternatives but simply to overrule a decision it loathed.") (citing Kamisar, Overrule,
supra at 85). But see Cassell, The Statute, supra note 127 (arguing for constitutionality
of § 3501); Cassell, Supreme Court's Failures, supra note 27 (same).
Dorf & Friedman, supra note 280, at 78-85 (analyzing hypothetical federal
legislation that requires warning of the right to silence, videotaping of confessions and
the provision that counsel may not attend interrogation sessions before the onset of
adversarial proceedings).
See id. at 81 (describing hypothetical "Anti-Coercion and Effective
Custodial Interrogation Act").
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Legislation could be conceived that would change the timing of
the provision of warnings, for example, or that did away with
the "second-level" safeguards imposed by Edwards.2 89
Acceptance by the current Court of legislation along the
lines proposed by Dorf and Friedman, or otherwise, would
require, at minimum, a re-thinking of some precedents from
Miranda to Dickerson.m While it is unthinkable that the Court
would soon reconsider wholesale its recent decision reaffirming
Miranda, incremental reformulations and doctrinal shifts are
not only plausible, but perfectly consistent with the Court's
past practice. 29' Indeed, even without legislation, justifiable
doctrinal shifts in the Court's confessions jurisprudence could
allow the introduction into evidence of statements made even
after a suspect asserted his right to counsel.
The Court, for example, could simply overrule Edwards.
Edwards, of course, was based on language in Miranda that
suggested that questioning must forever cease after a suspect
invokes his right to counsel and before an attorney is present.292
That language in Miranda, however, is dictum. None of the
four underlying cases in Miranda involved a situation in which
the suspect had asked for an attorney.' The post-Miranda
Courts have not hesitated to disregard other Miranda
language, such as that involving the stringent requirements for
waiver,2 ' and that suggesting that statements taken in
violation of Miranda should not be used to impeach the
defendant.295
M Most commentators who have proposed legislative solutions as an
alternative to the Miranda warnings would require something like videotaping of
confessions in order for judges to make a better assessment of the voluntariness of
confessions. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic
Rules," 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2001); cf. Dorf & Friedman, supra note 280, at 78-
85.
m Cf. Dorf & Friedman, supra note 280, at 80.
291An obvious example is the Court's recharacterization of the Sixth
Amendment Escobedo decision as a case vindicating the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491-98 (1966) (discussing facts of
Miranda v. Arizona, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965); Vignera v. New York, 207 N.E.2d 527
(N.Y. 1965); Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); and California v.
Stewart, 400 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965)).
See Darmer, supra note 35 (discussing vitiation of waiver requirement).
See Garcia, supra note 22, at 481-82 ("Although the Miranda Court
cautioned that statements taken in violation of its holding should not be used to
impeach the defendant's testimony, the Harris Court dismissed that portion of the
decision as uncontrolling dicta.") (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477; Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971)).
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A paring of Miranda to its core picks up on the
arguments of Professors Dorf and Friedman2 and Dean
Howe,2 as well as Professor Thomas, who argued that, in
essence, Miranda has become a case about due process notice.m
Under a plausible reformulation of Miranda, however, the
decision could remain tethered to the Fifth Amendment and yet
pared back to its essential elements. Doing away with the
Edwards rule would leave the central protections of Miranda
in place. In cases involving risks to national security, the
mischievous effects of the Edwards rule are manifest. There is
a real cost in a rule that, once the magic words are spoken,
provides protections even beyond those of giving the initial
Miranda warnings.
The Court's decision in Escobedo, that a suspect should
have the "guiding hand of counsel" at the investigation stage
had far-reaching implications.' The Court has struggled with
those implications ever since, given the problem so well
articulated by Justice Jackson more than fifty years ago: "any
lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms
to make no statement . . . under any circumstances."" Dean
Howe and others have argued that the "right-to-counsel aspects
of Miranda doctrine are unfounded," and that suspects should
not even be told they have the right to counsel during pre-
charge investigations 1 because, in constitutional fact, they do
not.w While this is probably right, we need not go that far to
reach the more limited goal of finding doctrinal coherence for a
public safety exception to Edwards. The Court can overrule
Edwards while leaving the requirement for the four Miranda
warnings intact.303
Reconciling the public safety exception with the
reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional premise in Dickerson
2W See generally Doff & Friedman, supra note 280.
See Howe, supra note 152, at 433-38.
M See generally Thomas, supra note 215. But see Susan R. Klein, Miranda's
Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567 (2001)
(criticizing Thomas's argument).
See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
3W United States v. Watts, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
301 Howe, supra note 152, at 343-35.
3m See id. at 343-35; see also Dorf & Freidman, supra note 280, at 85
(suggesting that right to counsel is not "core part" of the Fifth Amendment); id. at 80
n.80 (suggesting that Court should provide "better explanation" for its decision in
Edwards).
Cf. Howe, supra note 152, at 435 ("[A]ssertion of the right to counsel should
not call for more protection than assertion of the right to silence.").
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goes beyond what is necessary to deal with cases involving
national security that may confront the courts shortly.
Edwards need not be overruled in the short term. Rather,
given the Supreme Court's seeming tolerance for doctrinal
incoherence, a public safety exception to Edwards can be easily
justified by accepting the ongoing viability of the Quarles
public safety exception and then expanding upon existing
precedent under especially compelling circumstances like those
presented in Lindh.
CONCLUSION
While the Lindh court never had the opportunity to
address the question whether the public safety exception
applied to that case, or should be expanded, other courts will
inevitably face such questions in the near term. And nowhere
does the need for a robust public safety exception appear so
justified as in those cases dealing with terrorism and national
security. 4
More broadly, an expansive reading of the Fifth
Amendment may be ill-suited to the threats confronting the
nation in the twenty-first century; perhaps Dickerson would
have been decided differently had it come a few years later.
While there are certainly legitimate concerns about aspects of
the government's conduct in the wake of the September 11
attacks, it is also legitimate to question-again-both the
wisdom and the constitutional underpinnings of rules that act
to thwart investigation and interrogation where gathering
information is critical.
The Hamdi case may illustrate the government's
unwillingness to be hamstrung by the rules of civilian trials in
future similar cases, and Lindh might have found himself in
indefinite military detention had he not been the first
"American Talib" captured. 5 The idea of the government
W4 Even before September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court recently recognized,
in the Fourth Amendment context, that normal rules might have to give way in
emergency situations. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) ("The facts of this
case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger
alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a
showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a
bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a
firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.").
Adam Liptak, Accord Suggests U.S. Prefers to Avoid Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2002, at A14 (suggesting that cases of Hamdi and Jose Padilla [individual
accused of planning to explode a radioactive device who is also being held in military
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indefinitely detaining American citizens without charges is
troubling. Yet, also troubling is the prospect of forcing these
cases into a civilian model where interrogation must cease the
moment a suspect asks for an attorney. Does the Constitution
really require that a suspect be spared further questioning if he
asks for an attorney? It does not, and the price of rules that say
otherwise may just be too high.
detention] illustrate that government may now prefer military detention to trials).
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